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Abstract
In this paper we explore Ronald N. Giere’s contributions to the scientific realism 
debate. After outlining some of his general views on the philosophy of science, 
we locate his contributions within the traditional scientific realism debate. We 
argue that Giere’s scientific perspectivism is best seen as a form of carte blanche 
realism, that is: a view according to which science is a practice aiming at truth, 
and can warrantably claim to have attained it, to a certain degree; however, it 
does not place our confidence invariably in some specific feature of scientific 
representations.
Keywords: scientific realism; antirealism; empiricism; relativism; points of view.
Resumen
En este artículo exploramos las contribuciones de Ronald N. Giere al debate so-
bre el realismo científico. Tras esbozar algunas de sus ideas generales en filosofía 
de la ciencia, ubicamos sus contribuciones al interior del debate sobre el realismo 
científico. Argumentamos que es mejor concebir al perspectivismo científico de 
Giere como una forma de realismo carte blache, es decir: una concepción de 
† M. Gensollen: This paper is a research product of the “Science and Democracy” project 
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acuerdo con la cual la ciencia tiene como objetivo la verdad, y puede justifica-
damente afirmar haberla obtenido; sin embargo, no deposita nuestra confianza 
invariablemente en algún rasgo específico de las representaciones científicas.
Palabras clave: realismo científico; antirrealismo; empirismo; relativismo; pun-
tos de vista.
1. Introduction
Something that can be expected from a philosopher is criticism of another 
philosopher’s views. Indeed, philosophers are a curious bunch. We enjoy arguing 
for hours. Our outmost respect for the ideas of our colleagues is demonstrated by 
obsessively examining them in every detail, probing for flaws. Not surprisingly, 
this is how we intend to honor the recent loss of Ronald N. Giere: by engaging 
in a critical appraisal of his works.
Although, Giere’s intellectual objectives were broad, understanding science 
was chief among them. Not only he deemed science a subject-matter worthy 
of attention, but he also viewed it as an enterprise deserving to be praised and 
emulated. His work in science studies was engaging and he made innovative 
contributions to the philosophy of science, he ventured through paths beginning 
to be trodden that ever since have become safer avenues. 
In this paper, we will focus on his contributions to the scientific realism de-
bate. We argue that, rather than viewing his perspectivism as a ‘middle ground’ 
between realism and antirealism, Giere’s main contribution can be appreciated 
by means of what we call ‘carte blanche realism’. In order to support our claim, 
we first outline some major developments in Giere’s program in the philosophy 
of science. We then overview the traditional debate on scientific realism, locating 
Giere’s contributions in its proper place.
2. Giere’s views on science
2.1. Constructive realism
Ronald N. Giere developed the foundations of his philosophy of science in the 
last two decades of the twentieth century, within what Moulines called “modelist 
and kindred views” of science, particularly “semantic versions of modelism” 
(2008, 156). Some common features of these otherwise heterogeneous views are 
the following: (i) a rejection and/or mistrust of an exclusively formal-syntactic 
methodology in the analysis and reconstruction of both scientific concepts and 
theories; (ii) an abandonment of the notion of ‘theory’ in favor of that of a ‘model’ 
or a reinterpretation of theories within a semantic or pragmatic framework; (iii) 
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an explicit or implicit leaning towards antirealism and/or instrumentalism; (iv) a 
pragmatization in the analysis of science; (v) an emphasis in case studies; and (vi) 
a pluralistic trend (Moulines, 2008, 129-132).
Since its inception, Giere’s project was strongly naturalistic (1988). In the 
wake of Quine and Kuhn, Giere did not draw a sharp distinction in methodology 
and subject matter pertaining to the philosophy of science and those of psycholo-
gy, although he relied mostly in the cognitive sciences rather than constructive 
psychologism as a fundamental source (Giere, 1992, xvi-xvii). His modelist view 
of science departed from a representational notion of ‘model’, conceived as an 
abstract, constructed entity that is socially validated by the scientific community. 
Models can be linguistically described or determined by non-linguistic means. 
In his representational view, language is not directly connected to the world. 
Instead, statements, equations, diagrams, and so forth, define a model that fits 
or not, and only to some extent, with some aspects of the real systems by means 
of theoretical hypotheses and their similarity to the world (1999b, 55-56). Finally, 
Giere deemed impossible to reach an exact correspondence between a model 
and reality. That led him to uphold a constructive realism, where different models 
can offer alternative representations of a single real system. Even if they can be 
assessed as better or worse, this evaluation would not be determined only by the 
way the world is. This possibility, made salient by the supposed fact of under-
determination of theory by evidence, opens the door for relativism. That is why 
Giere rejected the standard objectivist framework, since he claimed the underde-
termination thesis relied on a standard objectivist characterization of truth and 
reference (1999a, 240). Thus, rather than viewing science as a producer of true or 
false statements in a standard objectivist sense, Giere urged us to think of science 
as a practice that produces models which, as it occurs with maps, may fit the 
world more or less. In this view of science, empirical evidence can contribute to 
decide which model fits better with some aspects of the world, notwithstanding 
the cultural values and presuppositions that played a role in the process of their 
selection and assessment (1999a, 241). The possibility of using alternative models 
would be determined by scientists’ interests and purposes (Giere, 2009, 222). Thus, 
his initial constructive realism gave rise to a perspectival realism:
The result is a kind of realism regarding the application of models to the 
real world, but it is a realism that is perspectival rather than objective or 
metaphysical. The sorts of general principles operative in some sciences 
provide a perspective within which particular models may be constructed. 
When, through observation or experimentation, these particular models 
are judged to be well-fitting, we are justifiably confident that the world 
itself exhibits a structure similar to that of our models (Giere, 1999a, 241).
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2.2. A naturalistic framework
Giere’s perspectival realism appeared, as his preceding constructive realism 
did, within a strongly naturalistic framework. It was also aimed at an audience 
and determined by its methodology. As for the former, Giere confessed not 
being interested in the general philosophical debate between realism and 
idealism, nor in detailed philosophical arguments, based heavily on assumptions 
from metaphysics, philosophy of language and of mind. His intended audience 
was composed rather by the community of science studies, philosophers, his-
torians, and sociologists of sciences, as well as interested scientists aiming for 
a broader understanding of their own practice (Giere, 2009, 221). As for the 
latter, instead of framing the issues in the philosophical debate of scientific re-
alism, Giere intended to examine the real scientific practice in the framework of 
contemporary science (2006, 3). Thus, he sought “to change the terms of the 
debate by developing an alternative view that is more than a minor variant on 
already existing views” (Giere, 2006, 3). Finally, he claimed that his perspectival 
realism: (a) offered an understanding of scientific statements in between abso-
lute objectivism and constructivism (Giere, 2006, 3); (b) accounted for actual 
scientific practice better than objectivist realism, without endorsing a wholesale 
constructivism;1 (c) incorporated the idea that scientific theories are partially 
social constructions, and that social contributions can be singled out by means 
of a detailed historical study of each case; and (d) assumed that a certain degree 
of contingency is always present in science, rejecting any claim that purports to 
be an absolute truth. In his own words:
A proper understanding of the nature of scientific investigation supports 
the rejection of all claims to absolute truths. The proper stance, I main-
tain, is a methodological naturalism that supports scientific investigation 
as indeed the best means humans have devised for understanding both the 
natural world and themselves as part of that world. That, I think, is a more 
secure ground on which to combat all pretenses to absolute knowledge, in-
cluding those based on religion, political theory, or, in some cases, science 
itself (Giere, 2006, 16).
As we have pointed out, Giere was seeking to change the terms of the tra-
ditional debate between realists and antirealists, which escapes his strictly 
naturalistic framework. His interest lied, in contrast, in the debate between 
objectivism and constructivism, that resulted from the historical criticisms of 
Kuhn, Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchism, and the sociology of science of 
the Edinburgh School.2 In this debate, Giere found himself closer to objectivism 
1 However, Peter Lipton (2007) labeled Giere’s position as ‘constructivism’, close to both Kant 
and Kuhn. Giere (2013) himself classifies Kuhn as a perspectivist, although only in his last stages, 
when he abandoned the notion of ‘paradigm’ in favor of ‘scientific lexicon’ (Kuhn, 2000).
2 There are different versions and degrees of constructivism. In its strongest version, it rejects the 
idea that the objects of scientific enquiry have mind-independent existence (Latour and Woolgar, 
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than constructivism, insofar as objectivism is not construed as a metaphysical 
position, but a sophistication of common-sense realism in which science makes 
lasting discoveries, that allow it to progress. Nevertheless, his defense of 
perspectival realism and his rejection of objective realism were grounded on ac-
tual scientific practice: “For a perspectival realist, the strongest claims a scientist 
can legitimately make are of a qualified, conditional form […] There is no way 
legitimately to take a further objectivist step and declare [something] uncondi-
tionally” (Giere, 2006, 5-6).
2.3. Scientific perspectivism
For Giere, perspectivism admitted degrees. Depending on the stringency 
of perspectivism, one can approach versions of relativism or objectivism. In its 
weakest version, perspectivism claims that, as a matter of contingent fact, all 
scientific claims are made within the framework of some perspective. A moderate 
version holds that, due to our cognitive abilities and the world, scientific claims 
must be conditional on a perspective. A stronger version holds that there are no 
perspective transcending facts at all. Since Giere located his perspectivism at the 
weakest degree –although he accepted some claims of moderate perspectivism 
(2015, 1)–, he stirred away from a robust relativism.
His perspectivism was developed in four stages. First, Giere found in color 
vision not just an instance of perspectivism, but an ostensive definition of it 
(2009, 223). Facing objectivism and subjectivism about color, generally held by 
philosophers and scientists respectively, Giere found in current science on color 
vision a perspectival position in which colors are relational, with both subjective 
and objective components:
[…] colors are best thought of as neither completely objective nor purely 
subjective, neither as properties of either parts of the material world or of 
subjective experience, but as a property of an interaction between the ma-
terial world and human observers. (2006, 38-39)
In a second stage, Giere extended his perspectivism about vision to scientif-
ic observation. The use of instruments in scientific observations involves the 
interaction with only some specific aspects of the physical world and is never 
totally transparent (2009, 223). An instrument is bound by design to receive 
1979, 128-129) or that they progressively emerge from indetermination through constructive 
operations (Knorr-Cetina, 1983, 135). In its modest versions, many related to the Edinburgh 
School, it holds the contingency thesis: either the process of doing science is so imbued of all kind 
of human judgements and values that theory choice is not determined by the real structure of the 
world (Bloor, 1976), or it is the set of social circumstances what determines the result of inquiry 
(Collins, 1981), or the interpretation of experimental results requires the professional judgement 
subject to ‘context opportunism’ (Pickering, 1984). However, moderate versions do not deny the 
independent existence of the world.
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some specific inputs from the phenomena under observation; the outputs it de-
livers, according to Giere, cannot completely eliminate the instrument’s contri-
bution. For instance, brain imaging technologies, using CAT or MRI, do not 
only produce images of the brain: “One cannot detach the description of the 
image from the perspective from which it was produced” (Giere, 2006, 56). 
From these considerations, one can wonder if there can be compatible or overlapping 
instrumental perspectives. Concerning compatibility, Giere thought there was no 
contradiction in claiming that different systems produce different images from 
the same inputs; but when different instruments deliver conflicting results: “…
scientists confronted with this situation would draw the conclusion that one or 
the other instrument is malfunctioning and proceed to try to figure out what 
had gone wrong. They would not accept the result as simply a curiosity of na-
ture” (2006, 57).3 Concerning overlap, Giere pointed out that it is a platitude to 
acknowledge that there can be different observational perspectives of the same 
objects. However, he did not think that this supports an objectivist realism:
Is this not good evidence that there is something “objectively” there? In-
deed, this is good evidence that there is something there, but this need 
not be understood as knowledge in an “absolute objectivist” sense. / The 
simple but fundamental point is that to be an object detected in several 
different perspectives is not to be detected in no perspective whatsoever 
(Giere, 2006, 57-58).
The last two stages in Giere’s perspectivism are meant to extend his considerations 
about color vision and scientific observation. A first extension concerns scien-
tific theorizing: “One reason why the perspectival nature of existing human and 
instrumental observation seems undeniable is that we can understand the ways 
they are perspectival in terms of broader theoretical perspectives” (Giere, 2006, 
93). Constructing scientific theories occurs in the setting of an ongoing scien-
tific tradition that sets the scientific agenda. Here, the key is that, according to 
Giere, the relation between claims and the world is indirect. But does realism not 
require that scientific claims be about the world? How are models and scientific 
claims connected to the world? Giere summed it up as follows:
3 Possible incompatibility can also be neutralized from potential relativistic intrusions. To that 
end, Giere urged that “…if we consider purposes in the construction of a theoretical perspective, 
the threatened incompatibility may disappear. […] If the purpose is to construct models of fluid 
flow, the principles of fluid mechanics, which treat water as a continuous fluid, generate by far 
the best fitting models. But if our purpose is to understand diffusion in a fluid, we must turn to 
the principles of statistical mechanics applied to molecules” (2009, 222). However, Giere went 
further towards realism by claiming that we can still question the nature of water beyond the 
possible application of models: “We need only be able to make a comparative judgment as to 
which perspective generates the overall best fitting models. Here the molecular perspective is 
clearly superior. We can understand how large numbers of small molecules might behave like a 
continuous fluid. We cannot understand the phenomenon of diffusion from a fluid mechanics 
perspective. That asymmetry is all that a perspectival realism requires” (2009, 222).
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Linguistic statements are used to characterize abstract models which are 
in turn used to represent objects and processes in the world. At the highest 
level, statements characterize relationships among abstract entities and 
properties. Here the statements define what I now call ‘principled models’ 
[…] They cannot be used to represent anything in particular. For that 
one needs to add further conditions which, together with the principled 
models, yield models that can be used to represent real things (2009, 222).
His last step was natural, given his cognitivist naturalism. Since most scien-
tific knowledge is a product of distributed cognitive systems, artifacts extend our 
cognitive capabilities allowing us to create new perspectives of the world (Giere, 
2006, 116). Having outlined Giere’s overall program, in the following section we 
will assess his contributions to the realism/antirealism debate.
3. Assessing Giere’s perspectival realism
3.1. Framing the traditional debate
The philosophical debate over scientific realism has, at its core, two different 
concerns about science that were paramount in Giere’s works. First, realist and 
antirealists discuss over the extent to which we are justified in believing scientific 
representations and outcomes (theories, models, and the like). We call this the 
‘Warrant Question’ [WQ]. Second, by attempting to identify the aims of science 
as a practice (that might not coincide with the goals of its practitioners), realists 
and their foes attempt to account for actual features of an important ongoing 
human enterprise: science as we find it. Let us call this the ‘Aims Question’ [AQ].
Scientific realists claim, and antirealist (somehow) deny, that science aims at 
providing true representations of the world and that current scientific outcomes 
have, to a certain extent, achieved that objective. Although the labels ‘realist’ and 
‘antirealist’ without further qualification might not mean that much, by situating 
themselves within this debate, many authors have detailed their answers to WQ 
and AQ. They identify some of the aims of science, as is currently practiced, and 
from them they address the issue of whether (and how much) we should trust 
science. Some currently influential versions of scientific realism can be joint-
ly labeled as ‘selective realism’, since they claim that science aims to accurately 
represent specific features of reality (e.g., its structure, the entities posited by its 
theories, and the like); accordingly, they claim that our beliefs in those features 
of the world are warranted by mature scientific theories. A recent alternative 
to these forms of realism, ‘Socratic realism’, is championed by Timothy Lyons 
(2016). It claims that while scientific theories aim at attaining some special class 
of truths, we might have no reason to believe that those truths have been attained 
by past theories or will be attained by future ones.
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As it is often the case when tackling big questions in philosophy, both the 
framing of the main issues and the potentially acceptable responses concerning 
scientific realism are highly contested. Addressing these basic concerns is prone 
to push back the debate towards technical details in logic, the philosophy of 
mind and language, epistemology, and metaphysics. Digressing on these issues, 
as Giere noted, would entail failing to engage with many of those whom he 
wishes to engage. However, his motivation for evading this nuances and philo-
sophical curiosities is not only a rhetorical device; as we saw in section 2.2, it is 
something that emerged from his naturalistic framework, which “is based entire-
ly on an examination of scientific practice, something appreciated by scientists 
as well as historians, sociologists, psychologists, and other students of science as 
a human enterprise” (2006, 5).
3.2. Giere’s response to empiricism
Nonetheless, some heated questions surrounding scientific realism can still 
thrive in a naturalistic environment. One of them, that has been historically 
prominent, relates to the distinction between observable and unobservable as-
pects of reality. This distinction prompts pressing questions about the aims of 
science and the warrant in our attitudes towards it. One can ask, along the lines 
of AQ, whether science aims to provide an accurate representation of both ob-
servable and unobservable aspects of reality. Additionally, unraveling the thread 
of WQ, one can inquire if there are basis for belief in the unobservable claims 
of our scientific theories together with its claims about observables. Restricting 
our warranted belief and the aims of science to the observable realm is what 
characterizes empiricism, as form of antirealism. (In)famously, logical positivists 
had drawn the distinction by means of different vocabularies, one consisting in 
observational terms and the other composed by theoretical terms. In drawing 
the consequences of this view, their approach was plagued by what seem to be 
unsurmountable problems (Maxwell, 1962; Putnam, 1966). To his credit, van 
Fraassen (1980) replaced this approach by turning it into an empirical matter. 
He equated the observable side of the divide with what can be reliably perceived 
by unaided human sensory modalities. He then responded to AQ by identifying 
the aim of science with empirical adequacy; similarly, his response to WQ, restricts 
warranted belief only to observable aspects of scientific theories. However, as 
Giere recognized (2005, 151-153), van Fraassen’s approach faces new hurdles. 
The scope and detail of human perceptual capabilities can radically vary among 
different persons. Moreover, beliefs can also have an influence on what people 
observe and how they report it. Besides, and more importantly, van Fraassen’s 
“approach does not accord well with widespread scientific practice”. It faces the 
problem of reconciling “the obvious fact that doing science is a human enterprise 
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with the widespread scientific practice of taking as evidence results that go far 
beyond the observational capacities of unaided human observers” (Giere, 2005, 
152).
As we mentioned at the end of the previous section, part of Giere’s response to 
this problem relied on extending the reach of observation. According to his view, 
a human together with and experimental setup can be regarded as a cognitive sys-
tem; within it the perceptual operation is cognitively distributed. Thus, even if a 
human cannot observe air pressure by means of her unaided sensory modalities, 
there is a sense in which a cognitive system of that same person with the relevant 
equipment and adequate training is able to detect changes in air pressure. This 
move, however, is only a partial response that avoids the main thrust behind 
WQ, i.e.: Are we justified in believing science when it ventures beyond obser-
vation? As we have seen, empiricists would respond “No”. Giere’s broadening of 
the use of observation does not respond to this question but it calls for a follow 
up question: Are we justified in believing science when it ventures beyond detec-
tion? To this, Giere did not offer a single categorical answer; instead, he hinted 
that this question is to be responded on case-by-case basis. This is a first question 
concerning scientific realism that remains open in Giere’s view.
3.3. Relativism and the absolute conception of reality
Another important question surrounding scientific realism that appears 
within the scope of Giere’s naturalistic framework concerns the objectivity of 
scientific representations. Along the lines of WQ, one can ask whether scientific 
theories provide us with objectively warranted representations of the world. 
Additionally, AQ prompts the question of whether achieving objective represen-
tations of the world is among the aims of science. Relinquishing objectivity is the 
hallmark of relativism.
Bernard Williams offered a compelling way to cast out antirealists concerns 
about objectivity by focusing on the “…very basic thought, that if knowledge is 
what it claims to be, then it is knowledge of a reality which exists independent-
ly of that knowledge, […] independently of any thought or experience. 
Knowledge is of what is there anyway” (2005, 48). As Williams noted, this as-
sumption becomes problematic once different worldviews compete to claim a 
status as knowledge. Each of these views constitutes a representation of (part of ) 
the world, and is grounded in beliefs, concepts, and singular experiences of its 
maker. Even if different representations are incomplete, or inaccurate, they might 
amount to knowledge; but for that to be the case “there must be some coherent 
way of understanding why these representations differ, and how they are related 
to one another. […] [A] story can be told which explains how […] can each 
be perspectives on the same reality” (2005, 49). Thus, explaining how different 
representations from diverse perspectives can be instances of knowledge seems to 
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require that there be something containing them, as well as their relations. One 
is tempted to assume that this “…will still itself be a representation, involving its 
own beliefs, conceptualizations, perceptual experiences and assumptions about 
the laws of nature” (2005, 49). As a result, the idea of objective knowledge seems 
to depend on what Williams calls ‘the absolute conception of reality’; “if we 
cannot form that conception, then it seems that we do not have any adequate 
conception of the reality which is there ‘anyway’, the object of any representation 
which is knowledge” (2005, 49).4
Requiring an absolute conception of reality to attain objectivity presents a 
basic dilemma to scientific realists. Either the absolute conception is “entirely 
empty, specified only as ‘whatever it is that these representations represent’ […
slipping] out of the picture, leaving us only with a variety of possible representa-
tions to be measured against each other, with nothing to mediate between them” 
(Williams, 2005, 50). Or there must be “some determinate picture of what the 
world is like independent of any knowledge or representation” (Williams, 2005, 
50); but that is open to the challenge that this is, once more, only a particular 
representation of the world, that provides “no independent point of leverage for 
raising this into the absolute representation of reality” (Williams, 2005, 50). 
Both horns of the dilemma seem fatal to realism.
In fact, Giere raised further concerns about objectivity by focusing on a hum-
drum scientific practice: the use of models as a strategy for the representation 
and study of phenomena or their underlying causes and mechanisms. Models 
are widely used in science, notwithstanding their acknowledged lack of accuracy 
and fidelity (Levy, 2017, 242). As Giere noted, most scientific models involve 
some degree of idealization, that deliberately distorts some aspects of (parts of ) 
the world being represented. This leaves objective representation, understood as 
a perfect fit with (part of ) the objective conception of reality, utterly out of the 
question. Thus, a second question for Giere’s views concerns evading relativism.
3.4. Perspectives and carte blanche realism
Giere’s innovation can be better appreciated through the view that we call 
‘carte blanche realism’. According to it, science is a practice that aims at truth, 
and we are justified in claiming it has been attained, to a certain degree; how-
ever, our credence in scientific representations should not be placed invariably in 
some specific feature of theories. As a blank check that fixes an amount without 
specifying who will cash it, our commitment to scientific theories should be 
4 Giere offers a somewhat similar rationale, that we find less compelling than that of Williams, 
by pointing out that “the question of whether any theoretical claim could be exactly true is con-
nected to the question whether any theory could be complete in the sense that it encompasses 
the whole truth about everything”. Concluding that “the only way any particular claim could be 
exactly true is it is part of a complete theory that is exactly true in every respect” (2005, 154).
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strong, but not declared in advance by the flavor of our (philosophical) realism. 
By emphasizing the accomplishments of science, carte blanche realism sets itself 
apart from Lyons’ purely axiological Socratic realism; in renouncing to declare 
the locus of this fit, it distances itself from selective realisms. In order to recog-
nize what carte blanche realism brings to the table it is useful to compare it with 
empiricism and relativism.
As we saw in section 3.2, Giere extended the reach of observation by con-
sidering cognitive systems in which instruments and theoretical models played a 
crucial role. Thus, it remained an open question to AQ just how removed from 
observation, and perhaps detection, could we extend the aims of science. Addi-
tionally, responding to WQ required a principled way to assess the justification 
for credence in scientific outcomes. Both of these concerns were addressed by 
Giere’s reliance on perspectives. To account for the notion of ‘perspective’ Giere 
found useful to explore the visual metaphor that gives rise to it (2009, 223). The 
notion of ‘perspective’ might overlap, at least partially, with that of a ‘point of 
view’. For Lehtonen (2011, 246-250) points of view have many components, 
some about the observer, others about the observational tools, and still others 
concerning the observed object. The variables pertaining to the observer include 
aspects of: (1) the subject or type of subject, (2) her interests, aims and values, 
(3) her mental position or attitude, (4) her relevant background knowledge and 
expectations, and (5) her social, cultural, and historic context. The variables con-
cerning observational tools might refer to: (6) the conceptual apparatus used by 
the subject, (7) the method of observation and (8) the basis of viewing or the 
data. Lastly, the variables concerning the observed object can include: (9) the 
object or focus of a point of view and (10) the observable features or properties 
of the object. The variability across these kinds of dimensions is meant to be 
included in Giere’s ‘perspectives’: “Missing from this scene is any autonomous 
representational relationship between a model and the world. In my presentation 
of scientific practice there is no such character. Rather, the fundamental relation-
ship is again triadic […] scientists use models to represent aspects of the world” 
(2009, 222). Thus, the main task for perspectival realism, both for its realism 
and its perspectival components, lies in assessing which aspects of scientific repre-
sentation remain invariant across different perspectives or points of view. Those 
are not bound to be identical with what each perspective classifies as ‘observable’ 
or ‘detectable’, thus superseding empiricism. Both the aims of science and our 
warranted justification in its outcomes can be extended beyond what a given 
perspective singles out as epistemically privileged observations.
However, Giere emphasized that there might not be a unique privileged per-
spective, or point of view, and “no such thing as an objective measure of simi-
larity that is completely general” (2005, 156). However, instead of giving up to 
a full-blooded relativism, he insisted that “realism need not require that we be 
in possession of a perfect model that exactly mirrors the structure of the world 
in all respects and to a perfect degree of accuracy” (Giere, 1999a, 241). His per-
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spectival response to relativism concedes that there might not be a single feature 
of scientific representation that remains constant across domains of inquiry. 
A ‘perspective’ resembles a Kuhnian ‘paradigm’, in that the truth of a scientific 
claim or the fit of models to the world can only be established within them; 
they do not require comparison to an absolute conception. Furthermore, their 
value cannot be determined by means of decisive observational tests. However, 
there are features that remain invariant across different models, even though they 
might not be the same across all models. In this sense, Giere’s perspectives are not 
as broad as Kuhnian paradigms, understood as an entire constellation of beliefs, 
values, techniques, etc., shared by the scientific community (2006, 82).
4. Concluding remarks
As seen through the glass of carte blanche realism, one might be tempted to 
indict Ronald N. Giere’s perspectivism for leaving too many unanswered ques-
tions. It all depends on one’s expectations about philosophical responses to the 
debate over scientific realism. If the goal of this debate was to strengthen our 
confidence in scientific practice and its outcomes, Giere offered a sparse response. 
To him, the traditional debate succumbed to the scandal of philosophy: it be-
came a perennial problem that, in the best-case scenario, stimulated our reflec-
tive and analytical abilities, leaving actual scientific practice in no man’s land. In 
this sense, carte blanche realism demands no further philosophical inquiry into 
the basis for our confidence in scientific representations across the board. Even 
if we pay our epistemological duties to successful scientific theories, there is no 
telling in advance which parts or aspects of those theories will cash the check. 
On the other hand, if the point of the debate was to improve our understanding 
of scientific practice, Giere’s approach is very fruitful. It encourages to pursue an 
intense agenda within the science studies community. It involves performing 
detailed case studies within a naturalistic and cognitivist framework, in order to 
establish where specifically our models are adequate, while acknowledging when 
non-epistemic values and interests can jeopardize objectivity and to what extent 
perspectival aspects of science pervade their outcomes.
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